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Despite the substantive findings of existing research, the electoral 
mandate is still an elusive category in representation theory and 
empirical political science. The article offers a conceptual framework 
that promises to properly evaluate mandate fulfillment in general, and 
pledge fulfillment in particular from the standpoint of the normative 
theory of representation. In this framework the non-fulfillment of 
pledges is not necessarily bad for representation since mandate 
slippage, or the gradual process of abandoning the mandate in the 
post-election phase, may come in both bad and good forms. The 
proposed framework also develops an empirical research agenda for 
measuring the causes of bad mandates and mandate slippage by 
relying and expanding on the toolkit of empirical pledge research. 
Outcome oriented pledges serve as a prime example of bad 
mandates, whereas agency shirking is a major cause of bad mandate 
slippage. 
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Despite the substantive findings of existing research, the electoral mandate is still an 
elusive category in representation theory and empirical political science.1 It was not so 
long ago that Andreas Schedler (1998: 191-192) contended that the ‘mandate theory 
of elections (…) has not commanded too much attention from political science’. 
Eventually, the concept received the serious treatment it deserved in the form of an 
edited volume by Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999). A serious but less than 
uncontroversial treatment.  
In describing the ‘mandate conception of representation’ the authors claimed 
that ‘mandate-representation’ occurs if ‘parties truthfully inform voters about their 
intentions and the implementation of these intentions is best for voters under the 
given circumstances’ (Manin et al., 1999: 30). While the first part of the definition is in 
line with most accounts of elections as a means to ‘confer the median mandate’ 
(McDonald and Budge, 2005), the second part introduces a somewhat alien element, 
and a fair amount of tension, into the equation.  
On the one hand, informing the citizens of proposed policies and incentives 
conducive to the implementation of these policies is well mapped in the principal-
agent literature of delegation and representation (see e.g., Besley, 2006). On the other 
hand, the injection of a benchmark of citizens’ interests in the theoretical framework 
other than their revealed preferences at the polling station creates conflicting directives 
for normative evaluation as well as a model that is less suitable for operationalization.  
Indeed, two decidedly empirical research agendas make only use of the first part of 
the ‘mandate-representation’ definition: pledge and saliency research. One way to 
operationalize the complexities of electoral mandates for empirical research is to look 
at explicit promises made during the campaigns. Studies following this approach 
create their databases by extracting relevant information from party manifestos and 
other electoral communications.  
They mainly come in two flavors, which are distinguished based on their 
respective understanding of mandates. On the one hand, ‘saliency’-based approaches 
(such as the classic study by Budge and Hofferbert, 1990) map general trends in 
policy-making (often relying on budgetary data) in order to gauge the relevance of 
party manifestos in setting the direction of government. ‘Pledge’ research, by contrast, 
singles out individual commitments and the fulfillment thereof, regardless of 
overarching tendencies in governance (see e.g., Royed, 1996; Thomson, 2001; 
Thomson et al., 2014). As the latter approach has generated a more extensive 
literature, in the following pledge research serves as our main focus. 
While these studies make use of an increasingly standardized set of variables, 
they rarely venture into uncharted theoretical territory. They mostly rely on an implicit 
mandate theory derived from the concept of responsible party government. This 
‘strictly empirics’ line of research, however, is not without its own shortcomings. 
Perhaps the most important of these, from the perspective of representation theory, is 
their dependence on the unpacked concept of pledge fulfillment. In this line of 
research pledge fulfillment is treated as an inherently positive result for the functioning 
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of representative democracy. The problem here is that, as it was highlighted by the 
dual definition of Manin and his co-authors, the redemption of electoral promises 
may in fact lead to catastrophic consequences for citizens under changing 
circumstances.  
The present article offers a conceptual framework that promises to properly 
evaluate mandate fulfillment in general, and pledge fulfillment in particular from the 
standpoint of the normative theory of representation. In this framework the non-
fulfillment of pledges is not necessarily bad for representation since mandate slippage, 
or the gradual process of abandoning the mandate in the post-election phase, may 
come in both bad and good forms. The proposed framework also develops an 
empirical research agenda for measuring the causes of bad mandates and mandate 
slippage by relying and expanding on the toolkit of empirical pledge research.  
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory 
of representation is presented along with a new metaphor of the process of 
representation: the delegation tree. Second, the concepts of bad mandate and 
mandate slippage are introduced. Third, the conceptual framework presented in the 
previous chapters is translated for the purposes of empirical research in order to be 
able to measure the factors leading to mandate slippage. The final section concludes. 
 
II. The Baseline Principal-Agent Model and its Discontents 
 
II.1. A delegation tree with branches in the air 
 
It is a common feature of contemporary works on democracy to assume that modern 
government must derive its ‘authority directly or indirectly from the people’ 
(Ferejohn, 1999: 131). It is also clear that variations persist in terms of the exact forms 
and channels of what we refer to as the program-to-policy linkage (Thomson, 2001). 
As the fictional government by the people was suppressed by an indirect government 
of the people, the concept of representation became inherently linked to the role of 
elections in a democracy.  
Elections are pivotal elements of representative democracy as they establish the 
core political relationship of the system by linking principals and agents via 
accountability (Shepsle, 2008: 30). They produce a bundle of winners—by way of 
sanctioning poor performance or forward-looking selection—and at the same time they 
also produce mandates. Though it manifests itself in various guises, the latter 
component is always present in campaigns—even as some authors downplay its 
relevance in effective electoral control (Fearon, 1999). In fact, classic public choice 
texts on political accountability share the view that ‘if voters vote on the basis of 
platforms or “issues,” politicians have little incentive to do what they promise. Thus, 
voters might be well-advised to pay attention to the incumbent's performance in office 
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rather than to the hypothetical promises of competing candidates’ (Ferejohn, 1986: 
7).2
 
This negative general attitude toward a concept of political accountability linked 
to and based on ex ante authorization3 spawned a sprawling literature linking popular 
preferences directly to societal outcomes, without any institutional or policy-related 
intermediary (see studies on ‘opinion/policy consistency/dynamics’, such as Monroe, 
1998). This results in cutting out the ‘middle man’, the institutions mediating the 
content of mandates; in the process the institutional environment that filters this 
content is removed. Thus, it sheds little light on the mechanism of preference 
transmission. And in this it presents both empirical and theoretical conundrums: it 
underestimates the importance—in fact: persistence—of electoral pledges and 
manifestos in actual campaigns. Perhaps more importantly, it also reduces voters into 
rational principals similar to corporate shareholders for whom the only relevant 
metrics is located under the red line of earnings reports. Yet politics resists such 
simplifications: elections may be won and lost over pledges that turned out to be 
untrue, or policy switches that contradicted existing party ideology.  
There are also persuasive reasons for giving elections (as opposed to, say, 
public opinion polls) a central role in revealing voter preferences. Election day 
establishes a political contract between principals and agents that is anything but a 
fiction or metaphor: it institutes obligations buttressed by constitutional law as 
opposed to the more informal mechanism of responsiveness. As it happens, this is the 
root that gives rise to the tree of representative government, and its crown consists of a 
complex structure of branches and leaves (see Figure 1). Party mandates, then, are 
best understood as the trunk of this tree of delegation: all future decisions emanate 
from this original authorization for the party/parties of government.4
 
 
                                                          
2
 Even researchers adhering to the mandate tradition acknowledged that mainstream studies had 
considered parties too weak to ‘function effectively as programmatic, policy effecting agents’, at least in a 
system based on the separation of powers (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990: 11). 
3
 The terms authorization and accountability are used in the sense of the principal-agent model of politics 
(see e.g. Ferejohn, 1999: 133). Authorization is the ‘means by which a representative obtains his or her 
standing, status, position or office’ (Dovi, 2011). Ex ante authorization demands that the authorization 
takes place before the execution of the task or mission at hand. Accountability is ‘the ability of 
constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g., voting an 
elected official out of office) or the responsiveness of the representative to the constituents’ (ibid.). 
4
 For applying the tree metaphor to public policy decision-making, see Lindblom (1959) and the 
literature centered around this classic book. 
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Figure1. The flow of legitimacy through a branch of the mandate process 
 
True, some decisions are not rooted in policy mandates in the substantive sense. The 
government’s relations with social partners and exogenous shocks all shape the 
general direction of government decisions. Nevertheless, the answers to virtually all of 
the challenges of governance are embedded in party ideology and the values espoused 
by a political community of like-minded people (consider, for instance, the motives 
behind the presidential nominations of Supreme Court judges in the U.S.). These are 
all part of a broader concept of mandate that is far from devoid of policy content.  
The totality of government decisions that involve a modicum of policy content 
are, therefore, relevant for mandate theory. This is true despite the fact that in many 
cases no clear path can be discerned connecting the actual policy decision to the 
original authorization. In other words, government resembles a tree with some 
branches suspended in the air. These branches may or may not have capillaries 
emanating from the trunk. Furthermore, some decisions may be in direct 
contradiction with pledges made in the same policy domain. In this respect, they may 
disrupt the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004) even as they perform some basic 
government function. The tree of delegation is hence supplemented by branches 
unrelated to ex ante authorization, and together they form government policy.  
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All in all, mandate models are integral parts of the more general field of 
political accountability. And in light of these considerations, when it comes to theories 
of political authorization, they appear simply unavoidable. Following this line of 
reasoning, in the remainder of this paper it is assumed that party mandates are vital 
elements of well-functioning representative democracies.5 Nevertheless, we are still 
faced with the problem of defining what exactly constitutes a mandate. 6 
 
II.2. The trunk of the tree: The direct flow of the mandate 
 
The concept of the electoral mandate has been the subject of interpretations and 
redefinitions by politicians and political scientists alike. Based on an analysis of the 
1984 presidential campaign in the United States, Hershey (1994) discerns three 
recurring thematic elements in mandate claims by politicians: the party mandate, the 
personal mandate and the policy mandate. This provides a useful starting point as it 
highlights the diverse conceptual sources of electoral mandates. The common 
denominator is the presence of a partially binding content which is associated with ex 
ante authorization. This partially binding mandate is the essence of representation; 
and is understood as a counterpoint to the appointment of delegates (with a fully 
binding mandate) and trustees (with a fully non-binding mandate).  
With mandate-based representation thus described, the next challenge is to 
make sense of the content of the partially binding mandate. Figure 2 breaks down this 
loaded concept.  
                                                          
5
 The question of personal vs. party mandates (as in studies on the personification/presidentialisation of 
party government) is less important for our current purposes as long as personal mandates involve a 
modicum of policy content (which is present even in ‘good type’-style approaches in which the candidate's 
policy preferences are similar to that of his voters (Fearon, 1999: 68).  
6
 One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: ‘our 
program consists of just one word: [we’ll] continue.’ 
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Figure 2 The content of the mandate: from parties to pledges. Source: Sebők – Soós, 2013: 48. 
 
In its most general form, the mandate is associated with a beneficiary: a party or 
person. Insofar as most leaders are members and representatives of their own parties, 
it is not necessary to distinguish between these two levels. Furthermore, there is an 
implicit linkage between leader and party: their shared history, decisions and ideology. 
In this sense there is arguably no such thing as a mandate without policy content, even 
if some leaders make no effort to present a manifesto to the public.7
 
Having said that, parties and politicians in developed countries do have a 
propensity to publish electoral programs (as witnessed by the main database of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project). This helps to make the case for the relevance of ex 
ante authorization in democratic theory and practice. Yet in trying to find the meaning 
of electoral mandates, manifestos are a part of the problem at least to the same degree 
as they are part of the solution. What authorization entails still depends on the 
researchers’ point of view, and the prime exhibit which illustrates this phenomenon is 
the division of the research community along pledge and saliency lines.  
Once again, both strands of research rely on a policy-based definition of 
mandate, only this time they consider explicit pledges and issue emphases as opposed 
to more implicit party ideology. Explicitness, on the other hand, is not a privilege of 
manifesto pledges: campaigns are ripe with reactive policy statements, which are 
                                                          
7
 One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: ‘our 
program consists of just one word: [we’ll] continue.’ 
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sometimes expressed only verbally, as opposed to the more proactive, written form of 
communication that is the hallmark of manifestos. Perhaps the best way to understand 
the overall policy content of campaigns—and, thus, that of the mandate—is to think of 
it as a word cloud. In this mandate cloud some pledges will appear more often, and in 
more varied forms and terms, while others retain a small, standalone place in the 
cloud. 
This diffuse policy mandate is difficult to interpret and evaluate for social 
scientists, let alone for the average citizen. That is one of the reasons why research 
strategies have gravitated towards the piecemeal approach of analyzing manifesto 
pledges or issue saliency. Studies regarding ‘cloud fulfillment’ estimates seem like 
science fiction in light of entrenched research agendas, but they are the next logical 
step all the same. From the electorate’s perspective, such a cloud may come closest to 
laying out the contents of a contract between themselves (the principals) and the 
parties (the agents). Insofar as campaigns are informative, and the cloud is filled with 
pledges and issues that send voters signals about future government policies, it is not 
an exaggeration to speak of a direct, undisturbed and uncompromised flow of the 
mandate.  
This direct flow represents the trunk of the delegation tree. Although its 
relation to the root of the tree—voter preferences—is ambiguous8, the moment of 
authorization creates a firm link between the two. In formulating the provisions of the 
mandate contract, it is also unnecessary to take a stand regarding bottom-up or top-
down dominance (where the bottom-up approach refers to the dominance of focus 
groups and opinion polls in constructing party platforms and top-down is a metaphor 
for elite leadership and, possibly, herethetics). As long as parties offer a selection of 
campaign contents, a mutually endorsed content for the principal-agent contract is 
within reach.  
 
III. Concepts for Disrupted Principal-Agent Relations  
 
III.1. Bad mandates: The missing or ill-defined source 
 
While the conceptual development of the delegation tree offers a better metaphor for 
real-life representative processes, the basic terminology of principal-agent model is still 
deficient when it comes to explaining disruptions of text-book principal-agent 
relations. A new dictionary explaining these phenomena could make use of the 
notions of bad mandates and mandate slippage. 
Elections play a pivotal role in setting the content of the mandate, yet the 
contours of this content are shaped before and after polling day. The pre-election 
period defines the comprehensiveness of the contract, while the post-election phase 
determines the rate of contract fulfillment. Taken together, these steps constitute what 
might be called—by taking a page from Thomson’s work—the preferences-program-
                                                          
8 
The preferences-program part of the general preferences-program-policy linkage is not without its 
problems. Indeed, Pennings (2005) contends that ‘the low degree of responsiveness of parties indicates 
that the linkage between voters and parties is the weakest one in the chain of delegation.’ 
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policy linkage. As in this model elections are the mechanisms whereby the contents of 
contracts are endorsed and formally authorized, the preceding and subsequent phases 
decide if the provisions of approved contracts are actually delivered on.  
It follows directly from this framework that the linkage may break down either 
prior to or following the election. In the former case, bad mandates are the result of 
bad campaigns or weak authorizations. In the latter instance, disrupted principal-agent 
relations are the outcome of interactions between self-interested strategic players. The 
former render proper contract-fulfillment impossible as the preconditions for a 
principal-agent relationship are not met. The latter entail breakdowns in the execution 
of ex ante authorizations. Table 1 presents these sources of the breakdown of the 
preferences-program-policy linkage in a stylized chronological order.  
 





Empirical examples Normative status 
Pre-election Bad mandate Low information 
campaign 
Manifestos are not 
published 
Bad 
Pre-election Bad mandate Low participation Significantly below 
average 
Bad 
Pre-election Bad mandate Weak authorization Heavily contested 














Multiple flows Coalition formation Minority preferences 




pledge fulfillment  
Post-
election 
Multiple flows Government 
structure 
Mismatch between 
pledges and the 











Bad mandates become incomplete or void contracts on account of either deficiencies 
in the pre-election period (the campaign) or weak authorizations provided by the 
electorate. Among the necessary preconditions for a meaningful contract between 
principals and agents, the content of the campaign is paramount. The quality of the 
imparted knowledge (scope, depth, concreteness) determines whether a partly binding 
mandate is created. Citizens’ perceptions of the contents of the contract (or the 
mandate cloud) are also shaped by party decisions regarding the issues that are 
emphasized or the relative ratio of rhetorical, ideological and policy statements in the 
campaign. Bad mandates result from low-information electioneering or from massive 
overlaps in the platforms of major parties concerning all key issues even as other 
parties are crowded out.  
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The second source of bad mandates are low-participation elections, for these 
sever the link between the preferences of the majority of voters (who decided to 
abstain) and the parties responsible for governing. The third source of bad mandates 
is the weakness of ex ante authorization. Here the term weakness refers to both the 
scope of victory (whether it is a plurality, a majority, a supermajority etc.) and the 
relationship between the share of the popular vote received by the winner vis-à-vis the 
actual seat allocation in the legislature (even as the form of this relationship may differ 
between polities).  
Bad mandates invariably put a dent in the normative basis of representative 
democracy. Such deficiencies imply that the potential for meaningful mandate-
fulfillment is limited. This is also why bad mandates are relevant for normative theory, 
for they constitute a key area of representative deficit. Coupled with the bad sort of 
mandate slippage (see below), bad mandates dismantle the preferences-program-
policy linkage which is one of the key elements in the process of providing legitimacy 
in representative democracies. In sum, input legitimacy may be ‘contaminated’ right at 
the source. Nevertheless, anomalies in mandate-based representation are just as 
common in the later stages of the process. 
 
III.2. Mandate slippage: When the direct flow stops 
 
Modern representative government is built on institutional complexity. This 
complexity disrupts basic principal-agent relations: multiple principals and various 
agents crop up throughout the delegation chain and—in some cases—the chain itself is 
broken. Non-majoritarian institutions draw their legitimacy precisely from the fact that 
they are disjointed from elected office holders. In light of this complexity, the very 
usefulness of the ‘chain model’ is called into question: delegation flows through 
diverse channels as opposed to just one; and these may further dissociate, to the point 
of resembling a river delta or the crown of a tree.  
The branches can be connected by differing logics of representation. A 
relationship may be based on delegation in the strictest sense: a transfer of authority 
with no room for maneuver (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). An intermediate form 
of delegation is based on a partly binding mandate, which allows for some wiggle 
room in terms of interpreting the contents of the contract. The third form is 
trusteeship, which is a non-binding transfer of authority when it comes to policy 
content.  
The delegation tree consists of the aforementioned forms of relationships 
which are created between principals and agents, such as parties, political leaders, 
ministers and government agencies. They jointly populate the space between the 
original authorization provided by the people and the policy outcomes that partly 
serve as the basis for future decisions on authorization. The theoretical consequence 
of this space between the people who provide ex ante authorization and the people 
who provide ex post authorization of government performance is that policymakers 
may become released from direct electoral accountability. This is especially true in the 
case of long-term trusteeship contracts (as is the case with supreme court or 
constitutional court appointees in some countries—once again, see Table 1).  
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This phenomenon may also occur in parts of the tree where initially there is a 
clear and uncontested direct flow of delegation from the root/trunk. Three such 
phases merit a more detailed discussion: coalition formation; decisions related to the 
government structure; and their implementation.  
Election results are often ambiguous. In fact, in parliamentary democracies a 
single-party majority in (both houses of) the legislature is the exception rather than the 
norm. This sets the stage for a duplication (triplication etc.) of principal-agent relations 
at the top of the trunk. Various parties run on a wide assortment of pledges and issue 
emphases, and the coalition formation process blends these policy contents into an 
unpredictable shape: coalition agreements. In some cases there may be more than 
one majority constellation (including grand coalitions and the like), and even on its 
own this fact blurs electoral mandates. Overall, the problem of incomplete contracts 
manifests itself already at this first stage. 
This coalition effect is further compounded by an unbalanced relationship in 
party coalitions. The hierarchical ordering of parties assigns different weights to party-
specific mandates (as each party proposed a different manifesto with varying issue 
emphases): the formateur party may have more clout over the coalition agreement, 
just as a minority party with a great potential for hostage taking (especially when the 
formateur party only won a plurality) can end up being overrepresented. Either way, 
the chain of legitimacy (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff, 2010) remains intact while delegation 
relationships are muddled. 
The second step concerns government structure. It is shaped by the (formal or 
informal) coalition agreement in the form of allocations of control over 
ministries/departments or by appointments to non-majoritarian bodies and issue 
emphases in the government program. It is also a manifestation of the underlying 
constitutional structure, i.e., the specifics of the system of separation of powers. 
Multiple principals may have jurisdiction over the same policy domain, which may 
result in obscuring responsibility for the fulfillment of specific pledges. Finally, some 
pieces of legislation may require a supermajority, which brings in the opposition as a 
new set of stakeholders.  
The third major layer of complex delegation relationships is located at the level 
of implementation. Bureaucratic/agency behavior may be one of the important 
reasons behind the failure to fulfill a mandate. Classic causes underlying this include 
agency shirking and problems related to agency (or more general policy) design. The 
former refers to cases in which the ideal policy position of the agency is different from 
that of its principal (the legislature or the executive—Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). 
Although the principals have various measures of ex ante or ex post control at their 
disposal, some level of shirking or laxity may nevertheless persist.  
Agency design may make matters worse: multiple missions or fuzzy missions 
confuse agents as to who their real targets are. Multiple and heterogeneous agents 
functioning in the same policy domain can replicate this jurisdictional overlap from 
the policy-maker level (where two departments are responsible for the same or largely 
overlapping policy area) to the ‘street level’ of bureaucrats (where e.g., two separate 
police units are responsible for the same or overlapping geographical area or crime 
type). And coordination between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions (such 
as those between a finance ministry and an independent central bank) can further 
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complicate mandate-fulfillment. Again, there is a limit to the extent to which careful 
policy design can be used to solve the ‘problem of many hands’ (Thompson, 1980) or 
the ‘difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different 
individuals contribute to decisions and policies’.  
The three phases of coalition formation, government structure design and 
implementation depicted in Table 1—along with many other potential layers along the 
same lines—represent interruptions in the direct flow of delegation. They break or 
dissolve parts of the chain of delegation. Thus, they contribute to mandate non-
fulfillment, which—in the existing research—is considered a negative outcome from a 
normative theory perspective. The next subsection makes the case that this perception 
is somewhat misguided, as mandate slippage may come in two flavors: good and bad. 
  
III.3. Problems of controlling agents through mandates  
 
Breakdowns in the direct flow of legitimacy through the tree of delegation cast a 
shadow on theories of ex ante authorization. From the perspective of normative 
democratic theory, this is not all bad news, however. Mandate non-fulfillment or 
mandate slippage may manifest itself in many different forms during the long process 
spanning the time when campaign pledges are made to when policy outcomes are first 
realized. Each phase has its own normative character, which also means that no 
generalization can be made with respect to unfulfilled promises without the analysis of 
the normative character of each segment. Together they are a testament to the 
problems and virtues of controlling agents through mandates.  
This ‘neglected side’ of mandate theory was seldom subjected to a more 
detailed discussion. In one of these attempts Schedler (1998) contends that electoral 
accountability is a complex and contested exercise. According to him, the public 
controversies associated with the very idea of mandate-fulfillment can be settled only 
by the voter, whom he considers the ‘supreme judge.’ While this is probably true, 
there is a possibility to dig deeper and analyze the causes that shape this normative 
judgment. And these causes may be connected to the position of the individual 
‘transgression’ in the mandate slippage process.  
The concept of mandate slippage is best understood as a progressive 
divergence—realized in the course of governance—from the policy content of ex ante 
political authorization. It may be the product of strategic agency or an inadvertent 
consequence of decisions unrelated to mandate-fulfillment. The result is a delegation 
tree with some branches firmly connected to the root and trunk; and others seemingly 
up in the air without such attachments.  
Not all such breaks in the delegation chain are normatively unattractive. 
Modern representative government draws its legitimacy from a number of sources, 
and policy content-related input legitimacy is just one such element. Trustee-type 
institutions of ‘government for the people’ take no formal orders from elected leaders 
(who serve relatively short terms) as they fulfill their long-term mission. And voters 
have a tendency to acknowledge decisions made in a complex political and 
institutional environment that includes coalition governments, multi-level government 
and elaborate structures of government agencies. In this complex environment, the 
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merits of mandate-fulfillment are relative. It is advisable, therefore, to undertake a 
piece by piece, phase by phase analysis of the process of ‘slippage.’  
Mandate slippages may be assigned to either of three categories based on their 
normative status. On the one hand, ‘good slippages’ allow for the contradiction-laden 
process of converting heterogeneous voter preferences into actual policy outputs. ‘Bad 
slippages’ on the other hand are unrelated to plurality and mostly consist of 
institutional frictions (principal-agent anomalies) stemming from the process of 
governing. A third category refers to slippages that highlight a trade-off between 
following voter preferences and other normatively worthy requirements (such as 
governability or stability). Table 2 provides a summary of these phases of the mandate 
slippage process.  
 
Table 2. Examples of mandate slippage (post-election phase) 











of cabinet government 
Incomplete 
contracts 
Electoral manifestos vs. 
government programs 
Depends on the degree 
to which issue emphases 
and major pledges are 
observed 







of executive power and 
bureaucracy 
Agency shirking  The implementation of 
an initiative is 
obstructed by 
administrative units 





Pledges of economic 
growth before a global 
financial crisis 
A consequence of bad 
mandates. Trade-off 
between serving the 
‘public interest’ and 
pledge fulfillment 
 
In parliamentary systems the first breakdown in the delegation process usually occurs 
no later than election night. On the one hand, the policy content of the mandate may 
be straightforward when single-party majorities emerge (but even in these cases 
‘skeletons in the closet’ may divert the content or emphasis of policy-making). At the 
same time, multi-party majorities may upset clear expectations with coalition 
agreements which create a government that pursues only a subset of the pledges 
featured in each participant’s manifesto. Moreover, these pledges may be 
contradictory, which creates the need to reach a compromise, along with the necessity 
to insert new or modified policy initiatives into the government program.  
The literature on the relative merits of single-party and coalition governments 
underscores the importance of a trade-off between governability and compromise. 
Ideological distance between coalition parties may be a force for good, but at the same 
time it may also act as a source of constant tension. Issues related to polarization—
which are widespread in contemporary two-party systems—may be mitigated by the art 
of compromise as practiced in multi-party governments and grand coalitions. In light 
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of the conclusions found in this line of research, the least that can be said is that 
coalition governments may be both natural and appealing outcomes of the electoral 
systems typically used in parliamentary democracies. 
The next phase of mandate slippage concerns policy-related problems 
stemming from the structure of government. Non-fulfillment in this stage may be due 
to either incomplete contracts or lack of jurisdiction. First, government programs are 
not identical with coalition agreements. They address issues that were not emphasized 
in manifestos simply because campaigns and governments prioritize different issues. 
In most policy areas there is no mandate content to begin governance with: these 
contracts are incomplete and may contain no information even for some salient issues.  
A solution may lie in the combination of pledge and saliency approaches. The 
more transparently a party's stance is on a policy domain, the better. But in a situation 
when campaign strategists made no specific attempts to highlight an issue, the saliency 
approach may fill in the blanks. Then, non-compliance with this more general policy 
mandate at this stage is detrimental to mandate-based accountability.  
With respect to the structure of government, the second problem of non-
fulfillment stems from lack of jurisdiction. Let us assume that parties make pledges in 
good faith and they are willing to execute them if the opportunity arises. Nevertheless, 
there is a considerable difference between being willing and being able to execute 
policies. Portfolio allocation is key in this respect: controlling the relevant chunk of 
government bureaucracy is almost a prerequisite for solving complex policy problems. 
While issue-oriented parties (such as Green parties) have a tendency to ask for cabinet 
positions related to their main area of concern, they may fail to secure them. The 
fulfillment of pledges concerning policy areas that fall outside the direct policy control 
of a coalition party should therefore be evaluated against norms that are less strict than 
the ones one would apply in the case of full portfolio control.  
After these party-related issues, the third phase of mandate slippage pertains to 
government and execution. Formal veto points are less of an issue at this stage, the 
focus is on more informal factors in the way of mandate redemption. In some cases 
policy outputs require a mere act of parliament. In other cases fulfillment depends on 
a complex web of agencies and their cooperation.  
Part of the art of governance is policy design and bureaucratic control. In single 
party settings non-fulfillment resulting from these two factors should be frowned upon 
from a normative perspective. This also applies to ‘agency slippage,’ regardless of its 
source (shirking, opportunism or sheer incapacity). In coalition governments it is 
more difficult to assign the blame to a specific actor. Having said that, ministerial 
control should serve as a useful rule of thumb for determining where responsibility 
lies.  
Pledges related to policy outcomes are trickier still. Exogenous shocks may 
force cabinets to change course and go back on pledges. Such policy switches may 
nevertheless be tolerated by the electorate in the case of actual disasters that justify the 
change. In other situations ‘partnership non-compliance’ might occur: as in the case of 
a pledge to end a war with a neighboring country. It follows directly from this 
discussion that pledges targeting outcomes are less enforceable and parties should 
therefore mostly refrain from them. And for those outcome pledges that are 
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‘unavoidable,’ the evaluation of non-fulfillment will have to factor in outside 
circumstances.  
The conclusion that can derived from this cursory analysis leads us back to 
Schedler’s contention regarding the final judges of government performance. 
Experience also shows that voters make complex decisions regarding incumbents: 
their evaluation involves the ex post analysis of performance (including ‘economic 
voting’, pledge fulfillment, etc.) and also ex ante assessments of future performance. 
In this larger shape of things, mandate-fulfillment is but one metric that informs the 
electoral control of agents. Mandate slippages need not involve democratic deficits, let 
alone representation deficits. From the average citizen's perspective, therefore, 
mandate slippage may either be a normatively good thing or a normatively negative 
thing.  
This section provided an introduction into the theoretical problems of mandate 
slippage. The final task is to relate the concept of good and bad mandate slippages to 
the existing literature on pledge fulfillment so that we can make empirical sense of 
these theoretical propositions.  
 
IV. Explaining Mandate Slippage with Empirical Variables 
 
Studies in the pledge fulfillment have used various sources of data and produced 
impressive results regarding the empirical strength of ex ante authorization theories. 
However, there is no overarching theme in the literature concerning mandate-
fulfillment besides implicit mandate theory. As the delegation chain is dissected into 
pieces based on the focus of individual researchers, the literature remains devoid of 
hypotheses regarding the preferences-program-policy linkage as a whole (with the 
usual caveat of government/opposition). 
Despite its purely empiricist inclination, the literature on pledge fulfillment still 
serves as the best choice available for making empirical sense of, or indeed measure, 
mandate slippage. Two aspects of empirical pledge research deserve special attention 
from the perspective of mandate slippage theory. First, its theoretical sources and 
normative statements regarding representation. The task here is to relate its explicit 
conceptual underpinnings or implicit tendencies to the framework presented in the 
previous chapter. Second, the groups of its empirical variables as related to the phases 
of linkage breakdown in general, and to bad mandate slippage in particular (see Table 
2). By highlighting pivotal variables influencing mandate slippage the measurement of 
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IV.1. The theoretical sources of pledge research  
 
The theoretical sources of empirical research on the program-to-policy linkage are 
drawn of a distinctly canonic set of literature. Recent pledge research (Kostadinova, 
2013; Toros, 2015; Praprotnik, 2015; Thomson et al., 2014; Naurin, 2013; Dobos 
and Gyulai, 2015) mostly takes inspiration from a small selection of classic pieces in 
pledge research (Royed, 1996; Artés, 2013; Artés and Bustos, 2008; Naurin, 2011; 
Moury, 2011; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Costello and Thomson, 2008; and the 
APSA papers by a group of first generational pledge scholars: Thomson et al., 2010; 
2012; 2014) and the theoretical literature these classic pieces make reference to.  
The two main theoretical sources of these classic studies are the literature on 
responsible party government (following, inter alia, APSA, 1950 and Klingemann, 
Hofferbert and Budge, 1994; for an overview see: Körösényi and Sebők, 2013) and 
the theory of parties and coalitions as adapted to European context (such as Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996; Strøm et al., 2008). Nevertheless, formal models of principal-agent 
relations are not prominently featured in any of the landmark studies of pledge 
research. 
The discussion of the normative value of the results is even less pronounced. 
The staple quotation here is by Mansbridge (2003: 515) regarding ‘promissory 
representation’. The works of Manin (1997) and his co-authors (Manin et al., 1999) is 
also often summoned. In neither cases, however, are empirical hypotheses directly 
related to these theoretical underpinnings. This is true even as the tension regarding 
the normative aspects of the results is palpable in some work in the saliency or pledge 
traditions.  
Pennings (2005: 14) acknowledges that ‘the Dutch case shows that there are 
several structural barriers for the mandatory role of parties in consensus democracies 
where mandates are always shared with other parties.’ But the next step in the 
normative analysis of these ‘structural barriers’ is missing. Similarly, Royed and 
Borrelli (1999: 115) conclude that ‘institutional control is fairly predictive of the 
relative success of the parties, although other factors are also influential.’ Once again, 
the analysis does not go further into an examination of the relative importance of 
‘party success’ and ‘institutional control’ for the proper functioning of the delegation 
chain. 
It is important to emphasize that these features of the literature are not to be 
considered to be shortcomings per se. Pledge researchers follow their specific 
research agenda, which is empirical in its nature. Furthermore, they do indeed make 
some progress toward generalizing the content of their preferred variables. With some 
refinements these can indeed be related to various stages of the linkage process and, 
therefore, can be factored into normative evaluations of the process of representation 
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IV.2. Variable groups in empirical pledge research 
 
The preeminent characteristic of empirical pledge research is the heterogeneity of its 
hypotheses and explanatory variables (see Table 3 in the Appendix)9. Perhaps the 
single quasi-permanent hypothesis in over 25 years of research refers to 
government/opposition party position, with government parties expected to achieve a 
higher rate of pledge fulfillment. Other recurring variables include status quo (in 
pledge content), consensus over a pledge in multiple party manifestos as well as 
ministerial control related to the pledge in question.  
While a degree of standardization has been attained regarding a core set of 
variables, actual hypotheses are still tailored to the research question of individual 
papers. Factors related to the institutional setting of government (majority/minority; 
single party/coalition; affiliation of the chief executive; portfolio control etc.) are well-
explored, the initial and latter stages of the preferences-program-policy linkage make 
no appearance in most pledge research. From voter preferences regarding various 
issues10 to agency and partner slippage the list of important components of mandate 
slippage are mostly absent from empirical studies of pledge fulfillment.  
Only a few studies venture beyond stand-alone variables in order to make sense 
of variable groups and their role in the linkage process. Royed (1996: 48) 
conceptualizes the ‘factors influencing pledge fulfilment’ in terms of ‘leadership’, 
‘constraints’ and ‘decision-making environment’. The first of these is usually not 
captured by variables in pledge research (such as a presence of a ‘programmatic 
leader’). The second is most often represented in the control variables section of 
models. The third, however, foreshadows the proliferation of institutional variables in 
comparative studies, introduced from the early 2000s.  
Thomson, Royed and Naurin (2010) group some of their variables into the 
‘government-type’ and ‘prime ministerial and ministerial control’ categories. Thomson 
et al. (2014: 11) list ‘institutional context’, ‘resources’ and ‘pledge characteristics’ as 
major groupings. Naurin (2013: 1057) registers ‘type of change’ and ‘issue area’ as 
composite categories.  
Table 3 in the Appendix presents these overlapping ideas in a unified structure 
along with the pertinent variables in empirical research. Besides exogenous factors 
(which partly incorporates the ‘resources’ category) and dummies (mostly used for 
election years/periods), three major variable clusters emerge: pledge-related, party-
related and government-related factors. Pledge-related variables are associated with the 
                                                          
9
 For saliency studies, the most widely used pairing of variables consisted of the issue emphases in federal 
expenditure categories (dependent variable) and those of election platforms (which was used as the 
explanatory variable; in this the authors followed the lead of Budge and Hofferbert, 1990). This research 
direction is strongly tied to the work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP) and the policy topic coding system used by the latter (see 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1). Recent developments added breadth to the 
approach, which now focuses on voter preferences as they are manifest in survey data (Pennings, 2005), 
inter alia. On the dependent variable side, a three-fold description of pledge fulfillment (fully, partially or 
not fulfilled) has emerged as the standard, even as the causal models in these pieces of research are 
almost exclusively binary: fulfilled/not fulfilled. (I thank the anonymous reviewer for making this point—
for exceptions see e.g., Toros, 2015: 246.) 
10
 For an exception see the survey method used by Naurin, 2011. 
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pre-election phase of the linkage process. Most often they refer to the content of 
manifestos and pledges (issue area; left/right understood in terms of e.g., tax cuts; 
status quo or change). Some others touch on the entire corpus of pledges (saliency 
measures) or the action or outcome oriented nature.  
Two further groups are relevant for the post-election phase of the linkage 
process. Party-related variables describe the political clout of parties (legislative 
control), its history (incumbency) or its future oriented pledges vis-á-vis other parties’ 
pledges (consensus). The third group, government-related factors, resembles previous 
categorizations most (‘government type’; ‘decision-making environment’). This three-
fold classification scheme provides a means to relate the underlying empirical variable 
groups to mandate slippage theory. 
 
V.  Measuring Mandate Slippage with Pledge Research Variables 
 
Situating variables in the linkage process is a crucial step toward measuring mandate 
slippage. First of all, some variables are unrelated to the concept of mandate slippage 
as they refer to the pre-electoral phase of the process. These variables describe 
pledges as components of manifestos: the content or saliency of specific promises. 
Anomalies, such as an overwhelming reliance on outcome pledges (as opposed to 
output/action pledges), in these cases are only relevant for a discussion on bad 
mandates, as opposed to the mandate slippage. 
As for the post-election phase of the linkage process pledge research offers 
insights into mandate slippage, at least in some cases. A simple re-ordering of the 
elements along the tree structure of Figure 1 will immediately shed light on the 
potential of adapting these empirical variables for the purposes of normative 
evaluation (see Table 4 in the Appendix).  
The linkage process unfolds through five major phases: the formulation of 
policy preferences; the formulation of pledges; the assignment of party seats in the 
legislature; government formation; and execution. A brief evaluation of the variables, 
as situated in this process, from a normative standpoint is as follows. 
Forward-looking voter preferences lie at the root of all ex ante theories of 
representation. However, these may or may not be reflected in party manifestos since 
bottom-up preference representation is limited by incomplete, transient and 
manipulated preferences. The actual mandate formation process is less reminiscent of 
a nationwide poll of opinions on all policy issue than an amalgamation of party 
stances, ideologies and polls of preferences regarding specific issues. The resulting 
electoral programs provide a transparent interface for voters’ interaction with parties, 
and for both interested parties the content of the contract is unveiled during the 
campaign. Information is readily available, at no or negligible cost, and voters make 
their choice by either using it or opting for rational ignorance about it.  
The key normative concept of these first two phases (preferences formulation; 
pledge formulation) is the bad mandate. A bad mandate is by and large unrelated to 
mandate content: electoral authorization is always ripe with content as a mandate may 
include policy, personal and party elements with only blurred lines separating these 
segments (Hershey, 1994). Manifestos also provide a wide selection of information for 
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voters, including the party’s position in the policy space (such as the left-right 
spectrum), what issues it emphasizes, and the general weight of policy issues as 
opposed to political statements with no policy relevance. The wide variety of variables 
in empirical pledge research describing content (context area; status quo; favored 
groups; expand/cut taxes; policy instruments) reflects the diversity of types of content.  
Nevertheless, the most widely used variables in this category only derive their 
normative importance from describing the information level of campaigns not actual 
policy positions. In this context better information (in terms of its scope, depth, 
concreteness: see the output/outcome variable) equals better mandates. Similarly, the 
lack of manifestos may be indicative of bad mandates (even as a counterweight to the 
lack of explicit manifestos the policy history of parties and candidates should also be 
factored in). More salient pledges, on the contrary, have a higher visibility in the 
mandate ‘cloud’ and, therefore, they are expected to be fulfilled at a higher rate. 
Finally, economic indicators are factored in both to electoral decisions and policy 
outcome, yet—as they lag behind political decisions; and an element of luck is ever 
present—they have no clear normative relevance.
11 
Election day provides a linkage between the electorate and parties, which forms 
the basis of a legitimate government (see ex ante authorization, as the first step in the 
delegation chain). Elections (via turnout, voting and the electoral system) convert 
policy preferences to party size in the legislature.  
The crucial element here is the proportionality of pledge fulfillment to party 
size. This sets the normative evaluation of a number of overlapping variables 
(including coalition/grand coalition; chief executive). Of these, government/opposition 
clearly enjoys a unique position, both in theory and empirical research: it selects the 
subjects of pledge fulfillment (governing parties) as well as the actual set of pledges to 
be fulfilled. Consensus pledges, which a number of parties explicitly support, are to be 
fulfilled at a higher ratio than, say, ‘purely’ opposition pledges because of their wider 
support. This reasoning also applies to pledges featured in the coalition agreement. 
Perhaps the most developed set of explanatory variables in current mandate 
research concern government formation. Yet most of these variables are related to the 
trade-off between governability (having a stable government as opposed to a constant 
flow of early elections) and pledge fulfillment. This phase gives rise to the idea of 
unified and divided mandates, with the latter prevalent in the cases of coalition 
governments. The number of participants (coalition/single party government) and 
their ideological background (coalition/grand coalition) in itself signifies no normative 
value. They may be the result of a dominantly proportional electoral system or 
heterogeneous voter preferences. Furthermore, ministerial control may be misaligned 
with pledges made, but may be the price to be paid for a stable government. 
While variables related to government formation may serve as the key focus of 
some pledge research, the ultimate phase of implementation is more important from 
the perspective of normative analysis. In this stage the mandate is already set for each 
policy area: either by virtue of the initial authorization or the reshuffle of saliency and 
                                                          
11
 In fact, the study of ’mandate cloud fulfillment’ instead of ’pledge fulfillment’ or ’saliency research’ 
could lead to a new, more realistic research direction. Needless to say, this would involve a more detailed 
analysis of campaigns contrary to the current focus on government fulfillment. 
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control due to government formation. Nevertheless, divided government still plays a 
role with regards to the problem of input vs. output legitimacy.  
The wider bureaucratic structure, including the institutions of the system of 
separation of powers is a ‘melting pot’, where sources of legitimacy are intermixed. 
From an institutional perspective, constitutional courts and independent central banks 
are designed in a way that is expressly meant to give them the ability to withstand 
public pressure. Thus, input legitimacy (the theoretical basis on which ex ante 
authorization processes are built) competes with output legitimacy: in the eyes of the 
electorate, the value of pledge fulfillment competes with ‘good’ policy outcomes. The 
trunk of the delegation tree is disconnected from certain policy decisions in the given 
policy domain: some branches grow out of this trunk, others are hanging in the air. 
This presents a complicated scenario for normative analysis. On the one hand, 
non-fulfillment or the lack of co-operation by non-majoritarian institutions (such as the 
role a central bank plays in pledges concerning economic growth) represents a trade-
off between input and output legitimacy. On the other hand, agency slippage, in the 
form of shirking by street level bureaucrats or others, is considered detrimental for the 
proper functioning of the mandate model. The status of what could be referred to as 
partner noncompliance is less straightforward: this is typical of outcome-related 
pledges, as they require the cooperation of extra-governmental actors. In these cases 
coercing non-obliging actors into joint action may have adverse consequences for 
representative government as a whole. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned factors have a bearing on the rate of 
pledge fulfillment. In general, pledge fulfillment may be favorable from a normative 
perspective, but non-fulfillment is not necessarily bad. As a result pledge fulfillment 
can only be normatively evaluated in the wider context of the process of 
representation, and by a detailed analysis of each step and variable related to this 
process. 
Mandate slippage can only be measured when provided a good mandate: 
missing and ill-defined sources are difficult to track through the process of delegation. 
Variables widely used in pledge research may prove key components in any empirical 
analysis of mandate slippage. They may fall into good, neutral or bad categories 
depending on the presence of logics competing with the inherent value of pledge 
fulfillment (such as governability or output legitimacy).  
As for our normative analysis, only a few variables stand out for their normative 
relevance both when it comes to bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. The 
composition of the mandate cloud lead to relatively good or bad mandates, as in the 
case of output and outcome pledges. Bad mandate slippage may result from agency 
shirking in the implementation phase. In contrast, the positive evaluation of 
government party fulfillment could lead to a wider category encompassing various 
forms of popular support and party size (pledges enjoying a wider consensus; put forth 




INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1) 123-152. 






This article introduced the concept of mandate slippage, and the related terminology 
of bad mandates, as well as good and bad mandate slippage. It relates these concepts 
to empirical pledge research as the research agenda of the latter presents a unique 
opportunity to apply these concepts to the reality of contemporary representative 
government.  
The argument unfolded in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory 
of representation was presented. Its various discontents include its reliance on the 
delegation chain metaphor and its inability to incorporate parallel processes of 
governance. For these reasons the alternative metaphor of the delegation tree was 
introduced. This captures more accurately the multiplicity of policy subsystems and 
the individual paths of various pledges from formulation to implementation.  
Second, the concepts of bad mandates, and those of good and bad mandate 
slippages were introduced in order to account for disrupted principal-agent relations. 
Third, the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapters is translated for 
the purposes of empirical research in order to be able to measure mandate slippage. It 
was argued that the theory of mandate slippage offers a hitherto missing general 
framework for situating and understanding empirical variables in the preferences-
program-policy linkage.  
Throughout our analysis the point was made that empirical pledge research will 
only make sense from a normative perspective if it can answer two simple questions:  
 
1. Is non-fulfillment bad for representation? 
2. If and when it is bad, which factors are responsible for this negative outcome? 
 
In contrast to extant research based on implicit mandate theory, the answer put forth 
to the first questions is: ‘not necessarily’. Indeed, one of the aims of this paper was to 
show that non-fulfillment may be related to neutral or even beneficial factors in the 
linkage process leading to ‘good’ representation. In the most simple rendering, ‘good’ 
representation consists of ‘good’ substance and ‘good’ process. On the one hand, a 
properly functioning delegation chain (or tree) provides the latter. On the other hand, 
it is quite impossible to forecast in a pre-defined manifesto all decisions of a 
parliamentary cycle of, say, four years. This is why both pledges and issue saliency 
matter—and also the missing element of underlying party ideology as well as the 
general trends in the (policy) contents of past decisions.  
‘Good substance,’ therefore, partly results from this more general link between 
campaign content (best understood as a ‘pledge cloud’) and government deeds. The 
other source of good substance is leadership or finding adequate answers in response 




The second research question concerns factors underlying pledge non-
fulfillment in a negative normative status. In the analysis two main culprits are picked 
                                                          
12
 This source is unrelated to ex ante authorization and, therefore, is of less importance for our current 
purposes. 
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out: bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. Bad mandates make pledge fulfillment 
irrelevant as in these cases there are no pledges to start with, or because they are 
vague, disorienting even. Bad mandate slippage causes the non-fulfillment of pledges 
in a way that is unrelated to normatively valuable trade-offs between fulfillment and 
governability or outcome legitimacy. 
In conclusion, a normatively relevant pledge (and saliency) research agenda 
should focus more on variables that have some bearing on bad mandates or bad 
mandate slippage. This entails more emphasis on the initial and ultimate phases of the 
delegation process: pledge formulation and implementation. A reoriented research 
agenda will make great strides toward fulfilling the promise of pledge research as the 
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13
 Abbreviations: exog. for exogenous; govern’t for government. Variable groups are presented by 
headline variable followed by related variables in the literature in brackets. GDP growth (Economic 
index); Election year (Election period); Context area (Issue area; Subject category; Policy area; Pledge 
field; Domestic; Socio-economic; Planned economy; Economic field); Status quo (Change); Expand/cut 
taxes (Expand/cut spending; More/less public sector); Policy instruments (Legislation; Review); Party 
platform topic saliency (‘prominenter’; Media coverage); Output (Action); Legislative majority (U.S. 
congressional control); Coalition agreement (Inter-party agreement; Government agreement); Ministerial 












































EXOG. GDP growth H3 V V 3
DUMMY Election year V V V V 4
PLEDGE Context area V V V V V V V 7
PLEDGE Status quo V H5 V V H2 V V V V H4 V 11
PLEDGE Favoured grops V 1
PLEDGE Expand/cut taxes V V V H4 V V V 7
PLEDGE Policy instruments V V V 3
PLEDGE EU H1-2 V V 3
PLEDGE Pledge saliency H8 V V H5 4
PLEDGE Output/outcome V V V V 4
PARTY Gov party vs. Opp. H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 V V H1 9
PARTY Incumbency V 1
PARTY Legislative majority V V 2
PARTY Party size / seat share H2 V 2
PARTY Consensus / Agree V H6-7 H3 V V H6 V 7
GOVERN'T Coalition/single party gov H2 V V V H2 5
GOVERN'T Coalition/grand coalition H2 1
GOVERN'T Minority government V H2-3 V V 4
GOVERN'T Short governments V V 2
GOVERN'T Coalition agreement H4 V V V V H7 6
GOVERN'T Ministerial control H3 H3 V V V V V H3 8
GOVERN'T Chief executive H2 V V 3
TOTAL 6 4 4 1 7 10 7 5 5 6 3 10 7 8 8 6 97
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Table 4. The normative status of pledge research variables 













representation is limited by 
incomplete, transient and 
manipulated preferences 
Pledges 




No clear hierarchy between 
policy areas is discernible when 




As long as they convey a clear 
message, status quo and change-





Preferences for favoured groups 




As long as they convey a clear 
message, government 
expansion/cuts-type pledges can 




Alternative policy instruments 
may lead to similar results 
Pledge saliency 
The fulfillment of more 
salient pledges is 
preferred 
More salient pledges have a 
higher visibility in the mandate 
‘cloud’ 
Output/outcome 
Output pledges are 
preferred 
Outcome pledges exploit the 
bounded rationality of the 
electorate; May only be fulfilled 
with luck. Outcome pledges can 
be considered to be an 







Economic indicators lag behind 
political decisions; an element 





A higher ratio of 
government party pledge 
fulfillment is preferred 
Government party pledge 
fulfillment is in line with 
responsible party government 
theory: Opposition pledge 
fulfillment may also be 
beneficial if it is related to 
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Legislative majority / 
party size 
Bigger parties should 
have more clout over 
pledge fulfillment (even 
in opposition) 
Electoral institutions may place 
the party with the largest vote 
share in opposition.  
Consensus / agree 
The redemption of 
consensus pledges is 
preferred 
Consensus pledges enjoy higher 









Coalition or single party 
government may be the result of 
the vote of a heterogenous 
electorate 
Coalition / grand 
coalition 
A higher ratio of 
formateur party pledge 
fulfillment is preferred 
This is an application of the 
reasoning with regards to party 
size 




There is a trade-off between 
governability and mandate 
fulfillment. Furthermore, a 
minority government may still 
be supported by a majority of 
the electorate (due to the effects 
of the electoral system) 
Coalition agreement 
The redemption of 
consensus pledges is 
preferred 
Manifesto pledges also featured 
in the coalition agreement are a 




There is a trade-off between 
governability and mandate 
fulfillment: a stable government 
may require the formateur party 
to relinquish portfolios 
pertinent to its most salient 
pledges 
Chief executive 
Insofar as the party 
affiliation of the chief 
executive is indicative of 
party size a higher 
fulfillment ratio is 
preferred 
As a general empirical tendency 
the party with the highest vote 
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There is a trade-off between 
input and output legitimacy in 
representative systems: Non-
fulfillment of pledges related to 
the policy authority of non-





Cabinets may resign over many 
reasons 
Agency slippage 
Agency slippage is a 
unique type of bad 
slippage 
As opposed to institutional 
frictional loss in the case of 
government formation this form 








Outcome pledges may differ 
from output pledges in their 
reliance on luck or players 
outside government. Non-
fulfillment may be related to the 
latter 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 






Pledge fulfillment may be 
favourable; Non-
fulfillment is not 
necessarily bad 
Pledge fulfillment can only be 
normatively evaluated in the 
wider context of the process of 
representation 
 
 
 
 
